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Editorial
Introduction: Can Cooperative Arctic 
Policies Survive the Current Crisis in 
Russian-Western Relations?
The Arctic has often been described as a zone of peace and cooperation.1 This 
description is not without merit: During recent “cold spells” in Russian-Western 
relations—as in the aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war—the Arctic states 
have managed to bracket off their Arctic policy from general East-West relations. But 
what of the current crisis between Russia and the West following Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea and subsequent involvement in Eastern Ukraine? Since 2014, relations 
between Russia and the West have been plummeting; never since the breakup of the 
Soviet Union has the situation between Moscow and Washington and other Western 
capitals been more strained. Indeed, many observers have described this as approx-
imating a new Cold War, or at least a Cool War.2 The longer this situation persists, 
the more likely are potential spillovers to the Arctic. We must ask: Can co-operative 
Russian and Western Arctic policies survive the present crisis?
This thematic cluster of articles discusses how the current crisis in relations 
between Russia and the West may influence the levels and forms of cooperation in 
the Arctic in the years to come. Until recently, the Arctic has stood out as a spe-
cial zone where Russia could engage in practical cooperation even with actors with 
whom relations were otherwise more strained.3 The literature has tended to portray 
the Arctic as either a new “promised land”—or an area of potential confrontation.4 
Shunning simplistic characterizations, we seek to take the discussion one step fur-
ther by analyzing Russia’s approach to the Arctic (and the approaches of the other 
Arctic states) as the product of a dynamic “two-level game”5 involving domestic 
factors as well as interaction with other states.
Applying a two-level analytical framework, we aim to fill important gaps in exist-
ing research on the Arctic: First, while several studies have taken a comprehensive 
approach to Russian Arctic policy,6 we offer new insights into the process of pol-
icy formulation, in particular the interaction between regional and central interests. 
Putin is widely seen as all-powerful in Russian policymaking. However, even in auto-
cratic systems like that of today’s Russia, policy is likely to be attuned to influential 
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domestic ideas, actors and institutions—especially when the legitimacy of the regime 
has been built on empowering certain institutions and/or on incorporating views 
dominant in the domestic sphere.7 We explore how domestic stakeholders, often with 
conflicting interests, succeed in shaping Russia’s Arctic policy.
Second, by studying the impact of the interaction between Russia and Western 
countries on the formulation of Russian Arctic policy, we provide new insights into 
international relations in the Arctic, as well as the broader field of Russian security 
studies. Whereas much of this latter literature has analyzed Russian security policy in 
isolation from domestic politics as well as from the security policies of other states, 
we have chosen a more relational approach.8 For example, if the Western Arctic pow-
ers come to view the Arctic as primarily an arena for state-contestation and security, 
this will, we argue, play into and shape Russian policies. Recognizing that one state’s 
security policy and internal politics are not formulated in isolation from the policies 
of other states, we adopt an interaction perspective to show how Moscow’s Arctic pol-
icy priorities and relations with the West fluctuate.
We thus seek to overcome two typical shortcomings in analyses of Russian policy-
making: the tendency to treat Russia as a monolithic actor, and the failure to take into 
account the significance of Russia’s interaction with other actors. 
Figure 1. Russian Arctic policy as a two-level game.
Within the broader field of Russian foreign-policy studies this cluster of articles 
contributes to the literature on how dominant and changing ideas inform and influ-
ence Russian foreign policy.9 The authors analyze Russian—as well as Norwegian— 
policies on the Arctic through the prism of three ideal-typical modes of policy, which 
capture ideational positions as well as specific policies and actions.
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The realist mode is driven by overall security interests and attention to the distribu-
tion of military power. According to this mode, a state which views itself as a great 
power in military terms will privilege security concerns in foreign policy, regardless 
of policy area.10 This ideational position finds practical expression in actions like 
increasing defense expenditures, prioritizing security over economic development, 
and undertaking various forms of military posturing.
In the institutionalist policy mode, the emphasis is on international regimes, institu-
tions and rule-based cooperation with other states.11 A state acting primarily within 
this foreign-policy mode would downplay security concerns, and even pursue com-
prehensive and committed institutional collaboration in the area of security pol-
icy. In policy formulation, this ideational position may find expression in actions 
like increasing the resources allocated to multilateral collaborative institutions and 
regimes, or introducing new initiatives aimed at strengthening cooperation (in this 
case, in the Arctic).
These two modes are well-known. We also introduce a third mode inspired by 
recent works on diplomacy: the diplomatic management mode,12 located somewhere 
in-between the first two. Here foreign policy is not shaped by security interests alone, 
but is characterized by careful adjudication between different courses of action within 
various policy areas. For example, Russia may be at loggerheads with the West over 
Ukraine and Syria—but that might make it even more important to maintain zones of 
cooperation on other fronts, including the Arctic. In practical politics, this ideational 
position can be translated into, for example, greater military posturing in the Arctic 
alongside intensified communication and cooperation initiatives. 
The articles in this cluster utilize the three modes to categorize statements, poli-
cies and actions on the Arctic by various Russian domestic actors and institutions, 
as well as by the Norwegian authorities (the latter as a proxy for “the West”). By 
covering the years 2012–2018 (Putin’s third presidential term) we can treat the pre-
Ukraine crisis situation as a baseline. 
The analysis is presented in a series of four articles to be published consecutively, 
covering topics ranging from domestic Russian Arctic policy formulation to for-
eign policy and international exchanges.13 Starting from the domestic agenda, Jakub 
Godzimirski and Helge Blakkisrud identify the key actors that shape Russian domestic 
policy on the Arctic. They find that Russia’s “Arctic” actors belong to various group-
ings, forming different sub-networks, and representing various interests, whether 
social, corporate, regional or state. Mapping the central- and regional-level actors 
instrumental in formulating Russian Arctic policy, the authors identify the “Russian 
Arctic-issue network”—a network of actors with partly shared, partly conflicting 
interests that must be mediated in order to find working policy solutions.
In the next contribution, Alexander Sergunin and Jakub M. Godzimirski discuss 
how Russian thinking about the Arctic has evolved in recent years, situating current 
Russian expert and official narratives on the Arctic within the broader context of the 
Helge Blakkisrud
380
debate on Russia’s place in the international system. Specifically, they investigate 
how various schools of thought influential in shaping Russian foreign and security 
policy have framed Arctic questions and positions. From official statements on the 
Arctic, they find that Russia’s current Arctic policy is influenced by both neoreal-
ist and neoliberal ideas, whereas the more idiosyncratic and often-cited “Russian 
exceptionalism” has little real bearing on policy formulation.
In the third article, Pavel Baev examines Russia’s “ambivalent revisionist/status- 
quo policies” in the Arctic, outlining the simultaneous pursuit of preserving coop-
eration with Western neighbors and commitment to building up own strength. Baev 
identifies four Russian Arctic interest domains: nuclear/strategic, geopolitical, eco-
nomic/energy-related, and symbolic. Across and within these domains he finds traces 
of the three different policy modes as well as of status quo and revisionist thinking, 
but concludes that, within the timeframe in focus, it is the revisionist tendencies that 
have been gaining ground.
The final contribution to this article cluster, co-authored by Julie Wilhelmsen and 
Kristian Lundby Gjerde, focuses on international interaction in the Arctic. The authors 
systematically examine changes in the discourse on Self and Other in Russian and 
Norwegian official statements, to establish what kind of policy mode characterizes 
official discourses in the years immediately prior to and after the Russian annexation 
of Crimea. Noting how the changing mode of the one state affects that of the other, 
they find that realist-mode policies increasingly dominate on both sides. As a result, 




 1. See, for example, Geir Hønneland and Olav Schram Stokke, eds, International Cooperation 
and Arctic Governance: Regime Effectiveness and Northern Region Building (Routledge: Lon-
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